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WILDLIFE CRIME AND DEGRADATION IN AFRICA: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS AND PROSPECTS
FOR A SECURE FUTURE
Kofi Ernest Abotsi, Paolo Galizzi2 and Alena Herklotz3
The poaching crisis in Africa poses serious development,
environmental, and security challenges to the continent. It
is pushing vulnerable and endangered species toward
extinction; fueling corruption and conflict; destroying lives;
and deepening poverty and inequality. We must all
collaborate to stop this horrific trade.
- UNDP Administrator Helen Clark4
At the dawn of the 21 st century, few places on Earth remain
untouched by humanity and, as our needs and populations grow, we
are leaving less room and resources for the wildlife with which we
share the planet. As a result, native animal populations the world
over are under threat from a variety of human activities - from
overexploitation to habitat destruction - making wildlife
conservation a crucial issue for our generation. As one of the most
biodiverse regions on Earth, home to several of the most well-known
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and beloved but also critically threatened species of our time, Sub-
Saharan Africa commands particular attention.
For decades, Sub-Saharan Africa's wildlife has supported the
growth of vibrant tourism industries in many countries, particularly
in Eastern and Southern Africa, becoming one of the sub-regions'
key sources of income, and providing direct and indirect employment
to hundreds of thousands of people. At the same time, however,
habitat loss has been gradually eroding African biodiversity and
ecosystems, while poaching and illegal trade in wildlife products
have begun to push vulnerable and endangered species further toward
extinction. Wildlife crime is now a serious global problem, ranking in
value among illegal trade in drugs, guns, and human beings. Beyond
the long-term risks to iconic species and the many livelihoods and
industries they support, the poaching crisis in Africa fuels corruption
and conflict and deepens poverty and inequality, posing serious
development, environmental and security challenges.
This article analyzes the growing wildlife crisis in Sub-Saharan
Africa, and leading efforts to combat the decline of these critical
natural resources. Parts One and Two explore the various drivers of
wildlife loss, with a focus on the growing role of transnational
organized crime. The article then moves on to review the many
regulatory gaps and challenges that arise under the international
framework for trade in endangered species, and the practical
difficulties of combating wildlife crime at the national level.
I. DRIVERS OF WILDLIFE DEGRADATION IN AFRICA
Wildlife decline is driven by a variety of factors, some rooted in
poverty and need, and others in profit and greed. This section focuses
on the passive forces and small-scale crimes of opportunity that
characterize the former category, with discussion of higher level
crimes to follow in Part II. Across the continent, the greatest long-
term threat to wildlife comes from population growth, one of the
many legacies of colonialism that have formed and shaped wildlife
conservation in the region. Surging populations and urbanization in
underdeveloped economies have spawned an array of interconnected
drivers of wildlife degradation, including loss of habitat, human-
wildlife conflict, and the bushmeat trade. Closely connected with the
overarching issues of multidimensional poverty, food insecurity, and
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distribution of agricultural lands, these factors are driven by need and
speak to the equally compelling need for integrated responses that
expand economic opportunities and the benefits of sustainable
wildlife management, to provide viable alternatives to the taking of
wild lands and lives.
THE IMPACT OF COLONIALISM
In many ways, the arrival of the colonial powers in the beginning
of the 19th century shaped the African continent. For one, colonialism
brought about drastic declines in human and wildlife populations
across much of the continent. 5 The Europeans introduced foreign
diseases, such as smallpox and the infectious cattle virus rinderpest;
and imposed new patterns of settlement, labor and land use that aided
the spread of illness.6 Likewise, outbreaks of indigenous diseases
such as malaria, dysentery, and trypanosomiasis (commonly known
as sleeping sickness), which claims the lives of both humans and
animals - also raged in the aftermath of colonial disruption.
7
The upheavals of colonization disturbed the relative tolerance that
Africans had developed against local strands of common parasites.
8
European conquest also disrupted the effective ecological controls
that African societies had long relied upon to contain those threats
and conserve wildlife populations. 9 Africans had long succeeded in
containing sleeping sickness, in particular, by establishing unsettled
bands of wilderness areas around their settlements, which provided a
buffer for people and livestock to avoid frequent contact with the
tsetse flies that transmit the disease. 10 Ignorant of these practices,
colonial authorities upset these delicate controls and unleashed
diseases that had long been held in check. Some areas suffered losses
5. Steven Feierman & John M. Janzen, Part Two - The Decline and Rise of
African Population: The Social Context of Health and Disease, in THE SOCIAL
BIAS OF HEALTH & HEALING IN AFRICA 25, 25-30 (Steven Feierman & John M.
Janzen eds. 1992) [hereinafter Feierman & Janzen].
6. Id. at 25-30.
7. Id. at 25-30.
8. Id. at 26.
9. Id. at 27-28.
10. Id. at 27.
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of up to one-third of the local human population,11 and 90% of
indigenous cattle stocks, 12 with wild hoofed-mammal species
succumbing to rinderpest in large numbers as well.
13
Declining numbers of people and wildlife, together with human
withdrawal from large swaths of territory newly infested with the
tsetse flies, visibly altered the African landscape. Thriving, integrated
ecosystems in which people and wildlife had coexisted gave way to
abandoned wilds, which the colonial powers mistook as the natural
state of the land. 14 This colonial misconception of Africa as a pristine
wilderness combined with European traditions of appropriating prime
land for private game reserves to cement imperial ideologies of
conservation that would dominate wildlife resource management in
Africa well into the twentieth century.
15
Hunting had long been a major part and pastime of European
empire and intensified under colonial rule. 16 Declining livestock and
wild prey populations brought Africans into competition with
colonial sport hunting and trade, which was already driving many
iconic species towards extinction. 17 Conceiving of African wildlife
as "imperial heritage"'1 8 whose conservation was part of Europe's
"civilizing mission on the continent," 19 colonial authorities
established wildlife reserves and regulations to safeguard colonial
profits from ivory and the globetrotting hunting elite. These colonial
conservation regimes cast local people as the principal threat to wild
habitat and wildlife and excluded Africans from the use and control
of their natural resources. 20 Across the continent, local people were
deprived of their ancestral lands and traditional food sources, as well
11. Daniel R. Headrick, Sleeping Sickness Epidemics and Colonial Responses
in East and Central Africa, 1900-1940, 8(4) PLoS NEGL TROP DIs (2014).
12. Id.
13. Bernhard Giibl, German Colonialism and the Beginnings of International
Wildlife Preservation in Africa, 3 GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 121, 125 (2006).
14. Samantha Jones, A Political Ecology of Wildlife Conservation in Africa, 109
REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 483 (2006). Thomas Lekan, Serengeti
Shall Not Die: Bernhard Grzimek, Wildlife Film, and the Making of a Tourist
Landscape in East Africa, 29(2) GERMAN HISTORY 224 (2011).
15. Gil3ibl, supra note 13, at125; see also Jones.
16. Giibl, supra note 13, at 123.
17. Giibl, supra note 13, at 125.
18. Gil3ibl, supra note 13, at 121.
19. Giibl, supra note 13, at 122.
20. Jones, supra note 14, at 485.
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as the ability to manage wild animals that threatened their livestock
and crops: "In short, they experienced imperial environmentalism as
a form of environmental imperialism; a process which saw the
reordering of space, the often violent expropriation of traditional
rights, enhanced vulnerability and the imposition of European
values. '' 2 1 Protected areas were established by methods that have
come to be known as the 'protectionism,' 'fortress conservation,' or
'fences and fines' model, which centers on excluding or removing
local people from the delimited area, prohibiting their consumptive
use of the environment, and enforcing their exclusion through state
22monitoring and policing. Access to wildlife and wilderness was
heavily restricted via such measures as expensive hunting licenses,
bans on indigenous hunting techniques and on hunting female and
young specimens, and limited hunting grounds, seasons, and
quotas.23 Subjugating African interests to impose European ideals of
Africa as an untouched Eden, colonial preservation schemes
separated Africans from their natural heritage.
The colonial separation of Africans from the natural resources of
their continent disrupted traditional wildlife and land management
practices that had sustained healthy populations for centuries.
Treating local people's use of land and wildlife as invasions into
pristine wilderness that needed to be preserved, drove them into
competition and conflict with species with which they had long
24coexisted. As is discussed in the following section, as the human
population has gradually recovered to resume and exceed its former
numbers, demand and pressure on natural resources has mounted.
People are now looking to expand agricultural production into
uncultivated land that was, in the interim, claimed for wildlife
preservation. Modern conflicts between human needs and wildlife
conservation are, in many ways, the persistent legacy of imperial
environmentalism that recast wildlife as the exclusive domain of
white wealth and tourism, of no benefit or interest to local people.
Bridging this gap, reintegrating local interests with the long term
health and recovery of natural resources, is an essential challenge and
factor in African development going forward.
21. Giibl, supra note 13, at 137.
22. Jones, supra note 14, at 485.
23. Giibl, supra note 13, 127-128.
24. See generally Jones, supra note 14; Lekan, supra note 14.
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POPULATION GROWTH AND URBANIZATION
The African population has recovered and increased remarkably in
the last few decades, and the trend is expected to continue in the near
future. The current population is estimated at 1.2 billion, which is
five times the population of 1950.2 5 As African populations increase
and wild lands are taken over for development, wild animals are
gradually losing their habitats and being pushed to the edge, forced
into competition and conflict with humans over diminishing
resources.2 6 With more people to feed, the need for agricultural land
increases along with demand for natural resources, such as
firewood. 27 Without proper consideration of the impacts on wild
species, agricultural expansion often results in wasteful deforestation,
and more frequent and serious clashes between people and wild
animals. 28 As people exploit natural resources for both sustenance
and profit, the degradation of African species and habitats has been
growing at an alarming rate. Taken together, habitat degradation
(31.4%) and loss (13.4%) are the primary threats to wild populations
29
worldwide, with average rates of deforestation in Africa from 2000
to 2010 estimated at 0.14% per year.30
Another key factor in wildlife decline is increasing urbanization.
Population growth has not been spread out over the continent, rather
it is centralized and flowing into cities. 31 With current and predicted
25. The African population was 9% of the global population in 1950. It is
expected climb to 40% by the end of this century. Danzhen You et al., Generation
2030 AFRICA child demographics in Africa (UNICEF 2014).
26. See United Nations Environment Programme, Environmental Change and
Socioeconomic Factors in Africa, (May 31, 2010), available at
http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/152610/ [https://perma.cc/XTM3-LDSZ].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. WWF, Living Planet Report 2014, 20 (2014), available at
http://bit.ly/l ssxx5m.
30. European Commission, 1 Larger than elephants: Inputs for the design of an
EU strategic approach to wildlife conservation in Africa 20 (2015), available at
http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/file/03/09/2015 -
_1546/devco african wildlife strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZC3-ZHV4].
31. Christine Kessides, The Context of Urban Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa 5 (The Cities Alliance 2006), available at
https://www.citiesalliance.org/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/CA-Docs/resources/pap
er-pres/ssa/eng/chap_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5BU-UNRZ].
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patterns of growth, it is expected that half the total population of
Africa will live in cities by 2030. 32 Urban growth and infrastructure
expansion present an additional complication for wildlife in the form
of habitat fragmentation. Deforestation and other forms of land
conversion frequently cut across wild habitats, bisecting migration
routes, breeding and feeding grounds, and isolating populations of
wild species, causing inbreeding and making species more vulnerable
to disease and less able to cope with habitat loss and change.33
HUMAN-WILDLIFE CONFLICT
Growing human populations and cities also lead to increased
contact between human and wildlife populations and, in turn,
conflict. For people the world over, local wild animals are generally
perceived as sources of food and/or pests that destroy crops and
livestock, and may occasionally pose risks to humans, as well. In
Africa, although smaller species, such as locusts and other pests, may
have a larger impact on humans in terms of scale, larger herbivores
and carnivores - including elephants, buffalo, and hippos, and lions,
leopards, hyenas and crocodiles - are generally seen as a bigger
threat.34
The case of the African elephant illustrates all three points of
conflict. First, local people view elephants as an excellent source of
meat, and generally would not hesitate to hunt them for food.35
Second, elephants can cause tremendous damage to crops. A single
elephant can easily destroy the growing fields of a small-scale
farmer, razing the crops on which they and their family depend for
32. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population
Division, WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS: THE 2014 REVISION, HIGHLIGHTS,
ST/ESA/SER.A/352, p. 7 (2014).
33. See Ian E. A. Yeboah et al., Emerging Urban System Demographic Trends:
Informing Ghana's National Urban Policy and Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa, 60
AFRICA TODAY 99 (2013).
34. F. Lamarque et al., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), Human-wildlife conflict in Africa: Causes, consequences and
management strategies (S. Morgan. Production et al. eds. 2009), available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/ilO48e/ilO48eOO.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q6G-
T3M5].
35. Chris Tomlinson, Demand for Elephant Meat Puts Africa's Forest Herds at
Risk, THE SEATTLE TIMES, June 7, 2007.
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sustenance and their modest annual income. 36 While non-lethal
elephant management methods have been introduced, such as
planting crops that are not as appealing to elephants, most are far
from having been perfected and conflict continues. Fencing
agricultural land to keep elephants out is another possible option, but
must be researched and implemented carefully to avoid habitat
fragmentation. Finally, elephants easily can and do maim and kill
people, and some problem elephants have been destroyed.3 9
Lions and other large land carnivores compete with humans for
wild game and prey on livestock and, occasionally, people. 40 The
threat to cattle, sheep, goats and other domestic herds not only
jeopardizes critical protein sources for local people, but also diverts
time and effort from education and gainful employment to wearisome
livestock guarding, and can lead to casualties on both sides of the
conflict. 4 1 Similar dynamics play out between humans and the Nile
crocodile. While crocodiles do not commonly threaten livestock, they
complete directly with humans for fish, which are another vital
source of protein for many Africans, so much so that many fishing
42stocks across the continent are dangerously depleted. In addition,
the species' preferred fresh-water habitat brings them into direct
36. IRIN, Rampaging Elephants Destroying Crops, IRINNEWS.ORG, Apr. 15,
2008, available at http://www.irinnews.org/report/77771/zimbabwe-rampaging-
elephants-destroying-crops [https://perma.cc/W88J-HKGL].
37. Id.
38. Agrisellex Electric Fencing, A Holistic Assessment of the Human-Elephant
Conflict, available at http://www.agrisellex.co.uk/articles/human-elephant-
conflict.html [https://perma.cc/9USG-URZ9].
39. World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Threats to African Elephants, World
Wildlife Foundation, available at
http://wwf.panda.org/what we do/endangered species/elephants/african elephants
/afelephants threats/ [https://perma.cc/DX9H-R5HE].
40. Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), Hope for the Lion, available at
http://www.pbs.org/earth-a-new-wild/episode-plains/hope-lion/
[https://perma.cc/DX9H-R5HE].
41. Peter Standring, Revenge Killings: African Farmers Massacre Lions,
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 10, 2004, available at
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/02/0210_040210_TVlionmystery.h
tml [https://perma.cc/9T4S-6V35].
42. F. Lamarque et al., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), Human- Wildlife Conflict: The Issues 9 (S. Morgan. Production et
al. eds. 2009), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1048e/i1048eO3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6GKF-HQFN].
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contact with humans fishing and gathering water for drinking and
household use.43 Even given the general underreporting of accidents,
crocodile attacks still account for the most human-wildlife conflict
casualties on the continent.44 Finally, while these predators are not
viewed as a primary food source, demand for crocodile leather
surged in the 1980s, pushing the species toward extinction in some
regions before a farming industry was established and wild
populations rebounded enough to be moved to the IUCN's 'least
concern' list.
45
As human populations increase, settlement expands into wild
habitat, increasing the risks of human-wildlife conflict. Frightening
or frustrating encounters with wildlife cause general discontent
among local people, who consider wildlife as threats and rivals,
rather than resources to be preserved or protected. Problem animals
make headlines and often have to be destroyed, fueling negative
perceptions and attitudes towards wildlife. It is vital for conservation
efforts aimed at addressing conflict issues to actively engage and
incorporate the needs and knowledge of local communities, to
promote conditions for sustainable cohabitation between human
societies and their wild neighbors.
BUSHMEAT TRADE
Another important cause of wildlife decline is bushmeat trade and
consumption. Bushmeat - that is meat from undomesticated species
caught in the wild - contributes up to 90% of total animal protein
consumed in some regions of Africa.46 As the human population has
grown, local fisheries have been depleted, while zoonotic disease
burdens have prevented livestock production from increasing enough
43. FAO, HUMAN-WILDLIFE CONFLICT IN AFRICA CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, 15-16 (2009).
44. Id. at 5.
45. Crocodylus Niloticus, THE IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES,
available at http://www.iucnredlist.org/details/46590/0 [https://perma.cc/GLS7-
E2P31.
46. Yaa Ntiamoa-Baidu, FAO Conservation Guide 33, Wildlife and food
security in Africa (1997), available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/w7540e/w7540e00.htm [https://perma.ccV2CV-
9RUM].
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to provide adequate protein.47 Bushmeat is also an important source
of livelihoods, and preferred over domesticated meat in many
circles. 48 As a result, Africans still regularly consume bushmeat,
which is widely hunted and circulated despite laws to the contrary.4 9
Indeed, rural communities that have hunted local animals for
centuries are often entirely unaware that taking wild game has been
prohibited in their area.
50
Some species that are commonly hunted for bushmeat are
abundant, with healthy, growing herds than may actually benefit
from population control, at least in some areas. 51 Most bushmeat
hunting is rather opportunistic, however, with hunters taking
whatever animals they come across, without regard to whether the
species is endangered or plentiful in that region. 52 Trapping is
especially problematic in this regard, as traps catch animals
indiscriminately, and can seldom be rigged to exclude protected
species from capture. 53 In cases in which particular species are
47. The International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), New ILRI Study
Maps Hotspots of Human-Animal Infectious Diseases and Emerging Disease
Outbreaks, ILRI NEWS, Jul. 5, 2012, available at
http://www.ilri.org/ilrinews/index.php/archives/9172 [https://perma.cc/4ANE-
MA5F].
48. See Michelle Schenck et al., Why People Eat Bushmeat: Results From Two-
Choice, Taste Tests in Gabon, Central Africa, 34 HUMAN ECOLOGY 433 (2006); A
test to determine whether consumers could distinguish between domesticated meat
and bushmeat, found that consumers were able to taste the difference and
demonstrated a preference for bushmeat.
49. Bushmeat, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service International Affairs, available at
http://www.fws.gov/international/wildlife-without-borders/global-
programlbushmeat.html [https://perma.cc/P2HE-637C].
50. Steve Boyes, No More Hunting of Any Kind in Botswana, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC VOICE, Nov. 15, 2012, available at
http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2012/11/15/no-more-hunting-of-any-kind-in-
botswana/ [https://perma.cc/F8FD-M224].
51. Xan Rice, Too Hungry, Too Destructive, Too Many: South Africa to Begin
Elephant Cull, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 26, 2008, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/feb/26/environment
[https://perma.cc/U8GH-9MGS].
52. Steve Boyes, No More Hunting of Any Kind in Botswana, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC VOICE, Nov. 15, 2012, available at
http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2012/11/15/no-more-hunting-of-any-kind-in-
botswana/ [https://perma.cc/8A8T-44EL].
53. Bob Serata, Primitive and Ruthless, Snares Threaten Africa's Endangered
Wild Dogs, African Wildlife Conservation Fund, 2012, available at
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sought out, it is often because their meat is considered a delicacy - a
status that is often conferred on the basis of rarity, and frequently
overlaps with the ranks of threatened and vulnerable.54
Beyond the threat it poses to endangered species, bushmeat is also
a cause for concern for human health. Specimens caught in the wild
carry a greater risk of disease, with the potential to spread zoonotic
disease to humans, as in the cases of monkeypox, HIV, avian flu and,
some scholars have speculated, Ebola. Since bushmeat is not
regulated, the meat is not inspected for disease prior to reaching the
market and may also be subject to unsafe handling, processing, and
storage. 56 Nonetheless, with malnutrition and lack of protein in
particular remaining a major challenge in Africa, bans on bushmeat
are not feasible while livestock production remains unequal to the
nutritional requirements of the population.57
Shrinking and fragmented habitat, human-wildlife conflict, and the
bushmeat trade are primary concerns for wildlife conservation in
Africa, as people and animals strive to meet their basic needs and
flourish. For many species, however, these burdens pale in
comparison to the pressure of the profit-driven poaching that now
fuels a multi-billion dollar criminal industry. Part I explores the
growing market for wildlife specimens and products, and the
http://www.africanwildlifeconservationfund.org/primitive-and-ruthless-snares-
threaten-africas-endangered-wild-dogs/ [https://perma.cc/8AAT-9MCX].
54. Melissa Cronin, African Bushmeat Market Exposed: 9, 000 Primates Killed
Each Year, THE DODO, Mar. 25, 2014, available at
https://www.thedodo.com/african-bushmeat-market-expose-482602551 .html
[https://perma.cc/C5UX-GHHH].
55. Nathan D.Wolfe et al., Bushmeat hunting and deforestation in prediction of
zoonoses emergence, 11 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1822 (2005), available
at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/ 11/12/pdfs/04-0789.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LCK-XX9B]; Andrew Elliott Kohn &Heather E. Eves, The
African Bushmeat Crisis: A Case for Global Partnership, 30 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y J. 245 (2006).
56. Gerard Flynn & Susan Scutti, Smuggled Bushmeat is Ebola's Back Door to
America, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 2014, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/08/29/smuggled-bushmeat-ebolas-back-door-
america-265668.html [https://perma.cc/T349-RJEM].
57. Jochem Bokhorst, The impact of forest governance arrangements on the
livelihoods of bushmeat actors in Ghana's High Forest Zone (Human Geography -
University of Amsterdam 2010), available at
https://www.uva.nl/binaries/content/documents/personalpages/r/o/m.a.f.ros-
tonenlenltab-four/tab-four/cpitem%5B 1 5%5D/asset? 1355373708891.
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increasing involvement of sophisticated poachers and smugglers,
who employ a range of illegal methods to carry out this deadly trade.
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II. THE DEMAND CREATING THE CURRENT CRISIS AND THE
INCREASING ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED
CRIME
In addition to wildlife loss related to the underlying human
development and natural resource management challenges examined
in Part One, African wildlife are increasingly threatened by an
unprecedented surge in targeted demand for wildlife products and
specimens driven by fashion, status seeking, and trends in alternative
medicine. Demand from wealthy consumers and the high prices they
are willing to pay - particularly the emerging middle classes in many
Asian countries - are now the main driver in the decline of many
species. Attracted by the tremendous profits to be made from the
rising demand for exotic pets and products, transnational organized
crime networks are increasingly involved in both illegal poaching
and trade. This section examines the factors driving the illegal
capture and killing of threatened species for profit, and its
transformation into one of the largest areas for transnational
organized criminal activity.
DECONSTRUCTING DEMAND
Levels of poaching and illegal trade in wildlife products and
specimens are growing at an alarming rate the world over,
particularly for endangered species whose very rarity helps fuel
58demand. From a black market assessed at $5 billion in 1997, the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) now estimates the
value of illegal wildlife trade at USD $23 billion per year,59 while its
sister agency, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
places the annual figure at USD $50-$150 billion.6 ° Many of the
African animals most impacted by profit-driven exploitation are
58. Robert S. Anderson, Investigation, Prosecution, and Sentencing of
International Wildlife Trafficking Offenses in the U.S. Federal System, 12 NAT'L
ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 14, 10 (1997).
59. UNDP, Combating Poaching and Wildlife Trafficking - Strengthening
Livelihoods and Governance (2014).
60. UNEP, UNEP Year Book 2014 emerging issues update - Illegal Trade in
Wildlife, p. 25 (2014).
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among the continent's most iconic species, such as elephants, great
apes, and rhinoceros.
Rates of elephant poaching are at a 20-year high, having doubled
since 2007 alone; meanwhile key rhinoceros territories have seen
poaching increase by as much as 7000%. 61 While Africa's
charismatic mammals are the most visible targets, trade also thrives
in a wide range of species, from insects and amphibians, to fish and
62
reptiles. In addition to live specimens, species are also sought out
for their meat, eggs, and specific body parts and organs, such as
bones, horns, shells, skins and tusks.63
The demand for trade in particular animals or products can
generally be grouped into two categories: Status seeking and
medicine. In the first category, private collectors and zoos seek live
specimens as exotic pets and displays, while products derived from
dead animals are desired for fashion and ornament, or consumed as
64culinary delicacies that confer status and prestige. In the second,
niche markets flourish around consumer beliefs in the curative
properties attributed to certain body parts in traditional and
65alternative medicine. The category of demand varies by species, as
well as market, with several species under pressure from a
combination of sources.
AFRICAN GREY PARROTS
The African Grey parrot is one of the single most-heavily traded
wild birds in the world, prized by the exotic pet trade for its
61. Id. at 26.
62. UNEP, The Environmental Crime Crisis - Threats to Sustainable
Development from Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife and Forest Resources.
A UNEP Rapid Response Assessment, p. 23 (Nellemann, C., Henriksen, R., Raxter,
P., Ash, N., Mrema, E. eds., UNEP & GRID-Arendal: 2014).
63. International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), Stopping Illegal Wildlife
Trade (2011), http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/wildlife trade us 0.pdf
64. Zimmerman, The Black Market for Wildlife: Combating Transnational
Organized Crime in the Illegal Wildlife Trade, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1657,
1669 (2003).
65. UNEP, The Environmental Crime Crisis - Threats to Sustainable
Development from Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife and Forest Resources.
A UNEP Rapid Response Assessment, p. 23 (Nellemann, C., Henriksen, R., Raxter,
P., Ash, N., Mrema, E. eds,, UNEP & GRID-Arendal: 2014).
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intelligence and ability to mimic human speech.66 Despite import
bans on wild specimens and thriving captive-breeding programs,
these parrots are all but disappearing from much of their natural
range.67 Experts point to breeders' ongoing practice of using wild
birds for breeding stock, rather than waiting for their captive-bred
stock to reach breeding age. 68 Breeders purchase mature adults on
the black market and sell their offspring to well-meaning buyers who
69unwittingly support the illegal trade. Pressure on this charismatic
species is compounded by their high mortality rates in captivity: 45
to 65 % don't survive to be exported.70 One of the most popular
avian pets worldwide, the number of captive birds may soon exceed
the population of African Greys in the wild.
ELEPHANTS
The poaching of elephants for ivory threatens the survival of this
highly intelligent, expressive African icon. Recent figures indicate
that, although poaching levels have fallen since a 2011 spike during
which nearly 100 elephants were killed each day, 71 illegal hunting
66. Paul Steyn, WILDLIFE WATCH: This Talking Bird Is Disappearing From
the Wild- Why is the beloved African Grey Parrot almost gone from the forests
of West and central Africa?, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 5, 2016,
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/02/160205-african-grey-parrots-wildlife-
trafficking-ghana-extinction/ [https://perma.cc/YAM5-5UTS].
67. Annorbah, Collar, Marsden, Trade and habitat change virtually eliminate
the Grey Parrot Psittacus erithacus from Ghana, 158:1 Ibis 82 (2016),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ibi.12332/epdf, Tracy Brighten, African
grey parrot silenced by trapping and logging, Feb. 2016,
http://tracybrighten.com/environment/african-grey-parrot-silenced-by-trapping-
and-logging/ [https://perma.cc/D826-RYVL].
68. Paul Steyn, WILDLIFE WATCH: This Talking Bird Is Disappearing From
the Wild- Why is the beloved African Grey Parrot almost gone from the forests
of West and central Africa?, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 5, 2016),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/02/160205-african-grey-parrots-wildlife-
trafficking-ghana-extinction/.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Richard Schiffman, Four countries are acting as safe havens for African
elephants, NEW SCIENTIST, June 5, 2015,
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn27665-four-countries-are-acting-as-safe-
havens-for-african-elephants/ [https://perma.cc/9UCV-R9G3 ].
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still claims 20-25,000 elephants per year. With population
estimates currently hovering around 500,000, that figure equates to a
loss of 4-5% of the African elephant population each year, which is
above the natural birth rate and, therefore, pushes the species further
into decline.7 3
Demand is driven by consumers who are willing to pay top dollar
for intricate ivory carvings, jewelry and other collectibles - piano
keys, knife and gun handles, canes, and personal seal stamps, among
others - based on ivory's status as both a luxury item and status
symbol,74 and an investment purported to hold its value very well.
75
In particular, studies show a correlation between ivory poaching and
consumer purchasing power in China.76 The market price for ivory
has increased nearly tri-fold since 2010 alone, from $750 to $2100
per kilogram (roughly $1000/pound),7 7 with estimates of the annual
street value of poached raw ivory in Asia, the primary demand region
for ivory, at $165 to $188 million.78
RHINOCEROS
The street value of the rhinocerous horn poached in the most recent
year on record is as high as $192 million USD. 7 9 The price of rhino
72. UNEP, supra note 65, at 32.
73. CITES Secretariat, Press Release: African Elephants Still In Decline Due
To High Levels Of Poaching (Mar. 3, 2016),
https://cites.org/eng/news/pr/african elephants still in decline due to high level
s of poaching_03032016 [https://perma.ccVX7E-W2U2].
74. UNEP, CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC, Elephants in the Dust - The African
Elephant Crisis. A Rapid Response Assessment, p. 40 (UNEP & GRID-Arendal,
2013).
75. Elephant ivory trade in China: Trends and drivers, Yufang Gao and Susan
G. Clark; The tusk at hand, Liu Lu, 2011-07-01, CHINA DAILY EUROPEAN WEEKLY
(July 1, 2011),
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2011-07/0 i/content 12816685.htm
[https://perma.cc/HJ5W-HXGQ].
76. CITES Secretariat, Elephant Conservation, Illegal Killing and Ivory Trade,
Report to 62nd Standing Committee meeting: SC62 Doc. 46.1, pp. 12 - 13 (2012).
77. Save the Elephants, Press Release: Price Of Ivory In China Triples In Four
Years, With Grave Implications For Elephants In Africa, July 2, 2014,
http://savetheelephants.org/about-ste/press-media/?detail- 1344
[https://perma.cc/BAU2-ALKA].
78. UNEP, supra note 65, at 32.
79. Id. at 37.
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horn, long prized for medicinal properties in traditional Chinese
medicine, has recently skyrocketed to as much as $75,000 per
kilogram in Vietnam, where it has been reputed to cure cancer.80
Demand persists despite the lack of conclusive scientific evidence of
the medicinal efficacy of rhino horn, which consists of keratin, the
same substance as hair and nails. 81
Prized in many comers of the ancient world for abilities ranging
from water purification to poison detection, as well as the beauty and
rarity of polished horns, rhino horns have been highly sought after
since as early as 5000 B.C. 82 Traditional medicine practitioners in
many east Asian countries prescribed rhino horn for centuries to treat
a variety of ailments, including fever, headache, hallucinations, gout,
poisoning, rheumatism, stroke, and typhoid.83 With market prices for
rhino horn now higher than the value of gold, platinum, diamonds
and cocaine, 84 poaching levels in South Africa - home to 80% of the
world population - have increased by as much as 35%, from 13
illegal killings in 2007 to 448 in 2011. 85 Experts caution that the
species could become extinct on the continent as soon as 2025.86
80. Julie Ayling, What sustains wildlife crime? Rhino horn trading and the
resilience of criminal networks, Transnational Environmental Crime Project,
Australian National University, Working Paper 212012, pp. 3-5 (2012).
81. Id. at 4.
82. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, FACTS ABOUT RHINO HORN,
https://www.fws.gov/le/pdf/rhino-horn-factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC5L-
NKFU].
83. Id; see also Kristin Nowell, Assessment of Rhino Horn as a Traditional
Medicine, A report prepared for the CITES Secretariat by Kristin Nowell on behalf
of TRAFFIC, pp. 19-29 (2012), https://cites.org/eng/com/sc/62/E62-47-02-A.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PQB6-HHWF].
84. WWF, Fighting Illicit Wildlife Trafficking: A Consultation with
Governments, 11 (WWF Global: 2012),
http://wwf.panda.org/about our earth/species/problems/illegal trade/wildlife trade
-campaign/wildlife trafficking report/ [https://perma.cc/ZW57-XG6C]
[hereinafter WWF, Fighting Illicit Wildlife Trafficking].
85. Ayling, supra note 80, at 4.
86. Id. at 5.
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GREAT APES
Central Africa is home to four of the world's five species of great
apes: bonobos, chimpanzees and two species of gorilla. 17 While
habitat loss remains the primary threat to wild ape populations,
illegal hunting and trafficking also take a considerable toll. 88 Adults
are killed for meat and body parts, and infants captured for live
sale. 89 The market for live animals is driven by private collectors
seeking exotic household pets and gifts for status and prestige, as
well as disreputable zoos, amusement parks and circuses that use
them as photo props and tourist attractions. 90
For every individual sold, experts estimate that as many as ten
others die from injuries during or shortly after the hunt, or from stress
and mistreatment in captivity.91 Studies suggest that illicit activities
claimed over 20,000 wild great apes from 2005 to 2011, more than
3000 each year.9 2 Profits from the sale of great apes vary widely. A
poacher who captures a great ape may earn as little as $50 USD,
while final resale prices have been recorded as high as $400,000. 9'
High demand and profits for the illegal trafficking of these and other
species have attracted transnational organized criminal syndicates,
for whom wildlife poaching and trade is now big business.
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED WILDLIFE CRIME
Wildlife crime is leading to the proliferation of guns in
exactly those areas that need less conflict, not more; it is
providing money for corruption in exactly those countries
in which corruption has already stalled all pro-poor
decision making and doing business legitimately is already
87. UNEP, Stolen Apes - The Illicit Trade in Chimpanzees, Gorillas, Bonobos
and Orangutans, A Rapid Response
Assessment, pp. 17-18 (Stiles, D., Redmond, I., Cress, D., Nellemann, C., Formo,
R.K. eds., UNEP GRID-Arendal: 2013), http://www.un-grasp.org/stolen-apes-
counts-illegal-trade-toll/ [https://perma.cc/K7X9-U35J].
88. UNEP, supra note 65, at 29.
89. UNEP, supra note 87, at 25, 31.
90. Id. at 40-41.
91. Id. at 36.
92. Id. at 37.
93. UNEP, supra note 62, at 29.
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hard enough; and it is oiling the engine of crime and
polluting efforts at good governance, democracy and
transparency in exactly those communities that need more
voice, not more silence... The fight to end wildlife crime is
a fight for humanity.
94
The rising value and demand for wildlife resources have created
significant financial incentives for organized criminal enterprises to
become involved in trade in endangered species. As a result, wildlife
crime is now increasingly dominated by emerging criminal networks
that specialize in wildlife poaching and trafficking, as well as
established organized crime groups that are expanding into this
lucrative market. This section reviews key features of organized
crime, and indications that the illegal trade in wildlife has strong
connections to sophisticated criminal organizations, corruption and,
in some cases, conflict.
In a 2003 report to the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice on the emerging issue of illicit wildlife trafficking,
the UN Secretary General - noting the lack of uniform agreement on
the definition of the term 'organized crime' - set out a useful list of
characteristics that, when present, suggest the involvement of
organized crime. 95 The Secretary General's list comprises the
following seven indicators:
" Multiple shipments through well-established routes,
methods and facilitators;
" Use of violence against rivals or law enforcement;
" Use of sophisticated methods of concealment or fraud;
" Trafficking of wildlife alongside other contraband;
" Laundering of profits;
" Use of front companies to provide legitimate cover;
94. IFAW, Criminal Nature, infra note 102, at 11 (citing Hickey, Valerie, The
fight to end wildlife crime is a fight for humanity, VOICES, PERSPECTIVES
ON DEVELOPMENT WEBLOG (Mar. 11, 2013).
95. UN Secretary General, Illicit trafficking in protected species of wildflora
and fauna and illicit access to genetic resources - Report of the Secretary- General,
12th Session of the ECOSOC Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice, Vienna, 13-22 May 2003, para. 29 (E/CN.15/2003/8, 4 March 2003),
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/commissions/12_commission!8e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DVP-7WPB].
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* Use of bribery and corruption to facilitate trade
96
In addition to the threats posed to endangered species, wildlife
poaching and trafficking now exhibits all of these hallmarks of
organized crime, raising important concerns for both local stability
and global security.
WELL-ESTABLISHED NETWORKS
As little as ten years ago, poaching was generally more
opportunistic, undertaken on occasion by poor, rural individuals or
informal groups seeking to supplement their household meals or
income. 97 Various middlemen with international contacts would buy,
solicit and transfer goods for resale, but their routes and smuggling
tactics were relatively unsophisticated. 98 As demand and market
prices for wildlife products have grown, however, poaching and
smuggling networks have become increasingly sophisticated.99 The
size of shipments now being intercepted and seized indicates the
involvement of highly advanced and organized criminal networks. 10 0
Today, while some low-level poaching and trade still persists, the
vast majority of wildlife crime is carried out by highly-skilled and
specialized transnational criminal syndicates. 10 1
Professional hunters now feed into well-established smuggling
rings that, in turn, supply extensive domestic and international
networks of clandestine retailers, taxidermists, and galleries. 102
96. Id.
97. Ayling, supra note 80, at 74 (citing Greg L. Warchol, The Transnational
Illegal Wildlife Trade, 17 CRIM. JUSTICE STUDIES 57, 65 (2004)).
98. Id.; see also Lorraine Elliott, Fighting Transnational Environmental Crime,
66 J. INT'L AFF. 87, 92 (2012).
99. Nigel Dudley et al., Editorial: Wildlife Crime Poses Unique Challenges to
Protected Areas, 19 PARKS 7, 8 (2013).
100. Anita S. Akella & Crawford Allan, Dismantling Wildlife Crime: Executive
Summary, TRAFFIC 1, 3 (2012) (citing Maryrose Fison, The £6bn Trade in Animal
Smuggling, INDEP. (Mar. 5, 2011),
http://www.independent.co.uk/environmentlnature/the- 1636bn-trade-in-animal-
smuggling-2233608.html; and Sharon Begley, Extinction Trade, NEWSWEEK (Mar.
1, 2008) http://www.newsweek.com/big-business-wildlife-trafficking-83865).
101. Ayling, supra note 80, at 74.
102. IFAW, Criminal Nature: The Global Security Implications of the Illegal
Wildlife Trade, 16, (2013), available at
http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/ifaw-criminal-nature-2013-low-res_0.pdf
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Modern wildlife trafficking networks move goods along complex,
shifting routes that seek out and exploit gaps in surveillance and
enforcement: 103 Smugglers are "light on their feet, frequently
changing routes and modes of operation as enforcement commences
in any one place, and continually working through the routes and
means of least resistance." 10 4 Proliferating unseen under the cover of
exploding globalization and international trade, criminal networks are
poaching and moving unprecedented quantities of wildlife products
across continents. 0 5
The sale of illegal wildlife products also thrives online, where
websites and dealers can be very difficult to trace. 106 Wildlife
criminals advertise on online auctions, forums and classified lists,
claiming their items were legally obtained, but not providing any
documentary proof; or using acronyms and euphemisms to avoid
detection. 107 Ivory, for example, is commonly advertised under the
[herinafter IFAW, Criminal Nature] (citing Maryrose Fison, The £6bn Trade in
Animal Smuggling, INDEP. (Mar. 5, 2011),
http://www.independent.co.uk/environment'nature/the- 1636bn-trade-in-animal-
smuggling-2233608.html [https://perma.cc/DGN4-UV6X]; and Liana Wyler &
Pervaze A. Sheikh, International Illegal Trade in Wildlife: Threats and U.S. Policy
7, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service (2010)).
103. Lorraine Elliott, Fighting Transnational Environmental Crime, 66 J. INT'L
AFF. 87, 93 (2012).
104. Elizabeth L. Bennett, Another Inconvenient Truth: The failure of
Enforcement Systems to Save Charismatic Species, 45 ORYX 476, 476 (2011)
(citing Ben Davies, Black Market: Inside the Endangered Species Trade in Asia
(2005); World Bank, Going, Going, Gone... The Illegal Trade in Wildlife in East
and South-east Asia (2005), available at
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/07/6276982/going-going-gone-
illegal-trade-wildlife-east-southeast-asia [https://perma.cc/YU4J-GVNA]; and
Bryan Christy, Asia's Wildlife Trade: The Kingpin, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Jan.
2010).
105. Lorraine Elliott, Fighting Transnational Environmental Crime, 66 J. INT'L
AFF. 87, 88-89 (2012).
106. CITES, Wildlife Trade on the Internet, 19 World - Official Newsletter of
the Parties (Sept. 10 2013), https://cites.org/eng/news/world/19/6.php
[https://perma.cc/NUH4-7GKE].
107. IFAW, Criminal Nature, at 16 (citing at n.132 Nic Fleming, Illegal wildlife
trading in Internet's deepest, darkest corners, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 4, 2012)
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/sep/04/illegal-wildlife-trade-
internet [https://perma.cc/EC9E-GSM3]).
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code words 'ox bone,' 'white gold,' and 'unburnable bone.' 08 Illegal
wildlife trade is also conducted on the so-called "deep web" -
websites that are not indexed or searched by traditional search
engines, and that protect the identity, location, and communications
of their users - which is widely used for various forms of illicit
trade. 109
In addition to the rise of specialized wildlife crime networks, the
illicit and transnational nature of the trade in endangered species have
also made it ripe for capture by established organized crime groups
that have traditionally operated in other markets. Already adept at
circumnavigating the law, well-known organized criminal
organizations in China, Japan, Libya, and Russia have moved into
wildlife crime.1 ° Using their sophisticated smuggling methods and
networks to conceal, falsify, and transport wildlife contraband
worldwide, organized crime syndicates are drawing additional focus
and concern. I
VIOLENCE
Wildlife crime networks also have both the capacity and propensity
to use violence. Armed with heavy weaponry, poachers present a
grave threat to wildlife, civilians and enforcement officers, as well as
to peace and security. Providing further evidence of the involvement
of sophisticated criminal organizations, today's poachers are
equipped with advanced weapons and technologies that far exceed
the reach of the average African citizen. Poaching gangs employ
"state-of-the-art heat-seeking telescopes, night-vision goggles, GPS
satellite receivers, automatic and semi-automatic weapons, rocket-
propelled grenades, and even helicopters and other military-grade
vehicles."'1 2 Heavily armed poachers have, in turned, spurred the
108. Id. at 17 (citing Todd Pittman, Online ivory trade threatens Africa's
elephants, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar.15 2013).
109. Id. (citing Nic Fleming, Illegal wildlife trading in Internet's deepest, darkest
corners, The Guardian, Sep. 4, 2012).
110. Lorraine Elliott, Fighting Transnational Environmental Crime, 66 J. INT'L
AFF. 87, 93 (2012).
111. Id.
112. Leo R. Douglas & Kelvin Alie, High-value natural resources: Linking
wildlife conservation to international conflict, insecurity, and development
concerns, 171 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 270, 273 (2014) (citing Jeffrey
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militarization and rise of shoot-on-site policies among wildlife
protection units, leading to escalations in violent conflict and
concerns about state violence and violations of human rights. 113 Over
150 rangers have lost their lives guarding the Democratic Republic of
Congo's Virunga National Park over the past decade alone. 114 The
International Ranger Federation reports that at least 1000 rangers
have been killed over the same period, and the global total may be as
high as 5,000 guardians lost.
115
CONCEALMENT AND FRAUD
The advanced weaponry employed by poaching gangs is matched
by increasingly sophisticated methods of concealment and fraud in
the transport of illegal wildlife products. Smugglers launder wildlife
contraband through legal supply chains, hiding illegally obtained
specimens or products underneath their legal counterparts, or mixing
them in together when the differences between individuals or species
are difficult to discern.1 16 Criminal networks also reuse, falsify and
trade species identification labels, permits and other official
documents, even going so far as to hack government websites to
Gettleman, Elephants Dying in Epic Frenzy as Ivory Fuels Wars and Profits, NEW
YORK TIMES, Sep. 3, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/world/africa/africas-elephants-are-being-
slaughtered-in-poaching-frenzy.html [https://perma.cc/FK2A-DPP3 ]).
113. Id. (citing Tor A. Benjaminsen et al., Wildlife Management in Tanzania:
State Control, Rent Seeking and Community Resistance, 44 DEV. & CULTURE 1087,
(2013); Dan Brockington et al., Conservation, human rights, and poverty
reduction, 20 CONSERV. BIOL. 250 (2006); and Paige West et al., Parks and
Peoples: The Social Impact of Protected Areas, 35 ANNU. REV. ANTHROPOL 251
(2006)).
114. Brian C. Howard, Rangers Killed in Africa's Oldest Park Push Death Toll
to 150, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 14, 2016, available at
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/03/160314-two-rangers-killed-virunga-
national-park [https://perma.cc/3MZD-V4Q2].
115. IFAW, Criminal Nature, at 10 (citing Amelie Bottollier-Depois, Ruthless
Crime Gangs Driving Global Wildlife Trade, Phys.org, Mar. 9, 2013, available at
http://phys.org/news/2013-03 -ruthless-crime-gangs-global-wildlife.html).
116. Id. at 15 (citing Simon Elegant, Eating Disorder: China's Appetite for
Exotic Wildlife Has Spawned a Thriving Black Market in Asia's Endangered
Species. Will Pangolin Be Eaten into Extinction?, TIME.coM, Sep. 26, 2005); Gail
Emilia Rosen & Katherine F. Smith, Summarizing the evidence on the international
trade in illegal wildlife, 7 ECOHEALTH 24, 27 (2010).
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produce counterfeit credentials for export.' 17 Live animals and illegal
products are altered in appearance and falsely declared, or concealed
in hidden compartments in clothing, luggage, shipping crates and
vehicles; 118 all too easy additions to the portfolios of organized
criminal enterprises already skilled in smuggling drugs, arms and
people.
PARALLEL TRAFFICKING, MONEY LAUNDERING AND FRONT
COMPANIES
The smuggling of protected species or illegal wildlife articles along
with other contraband is increasingly common, 119 giving further
indication that organized crime is heavily involved in the illicit
wildlife trade. Criminal organizations combine illegal shipments of
drugs and wildlife, at times using animals to carry or conceal
drugs. 12 There are also reports of drugs being used as payment for
the purchase of endangered species. 121 Wildlife specimens and
products are now frequently trafficked along the same routes - often
in the same containers - as other illegal commodities, as
sophisticated transnational criminal organizations increasingly
control this valuable trade. Just as illegal wildlife products are being
mixed in with shipments of other illicit goods, so too are the proceeds
from the trafficking in and sale of wildlife being laundered through
front companies and other elaborate, professional criminal
117. UNEP, The Environmental Crime Crisis, at 13-14; Gail Emilia Rosen &
Katherine F. Smith, Summarizing the evidence on the international trade in illegal
wildlife, 7 ECOHEALTH 24, 27 (2010).
118. Elizabeth L. Bennett, Another Inconvenient Truth: The failure of
Enforcement Systems to Save Charismatic Species, 45 ORYX 476, 476 (2011)
(citing Anon, Vietnam Seizes Thousands of Smuggled Pangolins (2008); Samuel K.
Wasser et al., Combating the Illegal Trade in African Elephant Ivory with DNA
Forensics, 22 CONSERV. BIOL 1065 (2008); Sharon Guynup, On the Ground:
Pangolins in Peril, Defenders.org, Winter 2010; and Andrew E. Kramer, At Russia-
China Border, Bear Paws Sell Best, N.Y. TIMES, Jun 29, 2010); Rosen & Smith,
supra note 116, at 7).
119. Lorraine Elliott, Fighting Transnational Environmental Crime, 66 J. INT'L
AFF. 87, 93 (2012).
120. IFAW, Criminal Nature, at 14-15.
121. Id. at 15-16 (citing Maryrose Fison, The £6bn Trade in Animal Smuggling,
INDEP., Mar. 5, 2011).
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schemes. 122 Indeed, the shell companies being used to launder profits
from trade in endangered species are often the same as are used by
drug and arms dealers, known terrorists and other criminal actors,
and these illegal proceeds are often reinvested into other forms of
crimes.123
BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION
The criminal groups and networks involved in wildlife poaching
and trafficking also make use of the final two hallmarks of organized
crime set forth by the UN Secretary General: Bribery and corruption.
Many of the source countries for the illegal wildlife trade in Sub-
Saharan Africa are low on the Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index, 124 and scholars have recently documented
empirical evidence of a correlation between ivory poaching and
corruption. 125 Wildlife crime syndicates target and exploit corrupt
officials and networks within compromised States:
[Criminal organizations] take advantage of the
'upperworld' of corrupt officials and politicians to evade
enforcement and control mechanisms and protect the illegal
chains of custody. Local officials, customs officers, police
and the judiciary are bribed to overlook illegal shipments,
to assist with false paper trails and forged documentation,
122. Lorraine Elliott, Fighting Transnational Environmental Crime, 66 J. INT'L
AFF. 87, 94 (2012); IFAW, Criminal Nature, at 16 (citing U.S. House Committee
on Natural Resources. Poaching American Security: Impacts of Illegal Wildlife
Trade. 110th Cong., 2nd sess., Mar. 5, 2008. Statement of John M. Sellar,
secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora-CITES).
123. Lorraine Elliott, Fighting Transnational Environmental Crime, 66 1. INT'L
AFF. 87, 94 (2012); see also IFAW, Criminal Nature, at 16 (citing U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. 2012. Ivory and Insecurity: The Global
Implications of Poaching in Africa. 112th Cong., 2nd sess., May 24, 2012.
Statement of Tom Cardamone, managing director, Global Financial Integrity).
124. Transparency International, 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index, (2015),
available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table
[https://perma.cc/XQT2-FTL4].
125. Douglas & Alie, supra note 112, at 275 (citing Andrew M. Lemieux &
Ronald V. Clarke, The International Ban on Ivory Sales and its Effects on Elephant
Poaching in Africa, 49 BR. J. CRIMINOL 451 (2009)).
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to help evidence disappear during prosecutions, to delay or
drop prosecutions, and even to return no convictions in the
cases of those who are brought to trial.
126
As is discussed further in Part III below, government officials too
often play key roles in the illicit wildlife market; undermining good
governance and frustrating efforts to strengthen and enforce
conservation law and policy. 127 Of equal, if not greater, concern
beyond its links to transnational organized crime, the illegal wildlife
trade now also plays a serious role in funding non-state armed
groups, including terrorist organizations.
LINKS TO THREAT FINANCE
Illegal wildlife products are now a key source of revenue for
identified extremist groups in several African countries. Somali
warlords have been reported to sell poached ivory and rhinoceros
horn to Indian Islamic extremist groups loyal to Al Qaeda. 128 The
Lord's Resistance Army - led by the infamous Ugandan rebel leader
Joseph Kony - is, likewise, implicated in ivory poaching and trade,
as are militia groups in Chad, the Central African Republic, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger and Sudan, including the
Janjaweed. 129 UNEP estimates that the annual income derived from
126. Lorraine Elliott, Fighting Transnational Environmental Crime, 66 J. INT'L
AFF. 87, 94 (2012).
127. Douglas & Alie, supra note 112, at 275 (citing Jeffrey Gettleman, Elephants
Dying in Epic Frenzy as Ivory Fuels Wars and Profits, NEW YORK TIMES, Sep. 3,
2012); Andrew M. Lemieux & Ronald V. Clarke, The International Ban on Ivory
Sales and its Effects on Elephant Poaching in Africa, 49 BR. J. CRIMINOL 451
(2009); R. T. Naylor, The Underworld of Ivory, 42 CRIM. L. & Soc. CHANGE 261
(2005); and Greg L. Warchol, The Transnational Illegal Wildlife Trade, 17 CRIM.
JUSTICE STUDIES 57 (2004)).
128. Id. at 273 (citing Liana Wyler & Pervaze A. Sheikh, International Illegal
Trade in Wildlife: Threats and U.S. policy 7, United States Congressional Research
Service, Washington, DC (2008)).
129. UNEP, The Environmental Crime Crisis - Threats to Sustainable
Development from Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife and Forest Resources.
A UNEP Rapid Response Assessment, p.78 (Nellemann, C., Henriksen, R., Raxter,
P., Ash, N., Mrema, E. (Eds), UNEP & GRID-Arendal: 2014); see also
International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), Criminal Nature: The Global
Security Implications of the Illegal Wildlife Trade, 11-14, (2013), available at
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illegal ivory by non-state armed groups may be as high as $12.3
million USD. 130 The links between organized wildlife poaching and
trafficking and militia groups clear concerns for local, regional and
international stability and security.
Wildlife crime is a complex and multi-faceted issue, involving
poverty and development, as well as the ominous dimensions of
organized crime, corruption, and conflict. It destroys vital natural
resources that sustain livelihoods and valuable tourism, benefitting a
small criminal fraternity at the expense of national economies that are
deprived of billions in lost revenue and development opportunities
for sustainable use. The following section explores the challenges of
addressing illegal wildlife trade under international and domestic
wildlife conservation regimes that were not developed to tackle crime
of this scale or sophistication.
III. REGULATORY CHALLENGES IN COMBATING
WILDLIFE CRIME
The principal international instrument pertaining to international
trade in endangered species is the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). 131
Concluded in 1973 in response to growing concerns about
endangered species, CITES aims to control and regulate trade in wild
plant and animal specimens to ensure that trade does not threaten
species survival. While the Convention was not originally designed
to combat wildlife crime, it nonetheless provides the framework
through which wildlife trafficking is controlled, limited, and
criminalized. This section explores this framework, and the myriad
gaps and challenges that limit the effectiveness of the CITES regime
for preventing and suppressing wildlife crime.
http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/ifaw-criminal-nature-2013 -low-resO.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PZ7T-DYVK].
130. UNEP, The Environmental Crime Crisis - Threats to Sustainable
Development from Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife and Forest Resources.
A UNEP Rapid Response Assessment, p. 78 (Nellemann, C., Henriksen, R., Raxter,
P., Ash, N., Mrema, E. eds., UNEP & GRID-Arendal: 2014).
131. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES), 993 UNTS 243, (1973), https://cites.org/eng/disc/text.php
[https://cites.org/eng/disc/text.php].
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THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED
SPECIES (CITES)
1 3 2
Originally signed by twenty-one countries, CITES now has a
membership of 181 states. 133 The treaty currently extends protection
to approximately 5,600 species of animals and 30,000 species of
plants. Trade in protected species is regulated through a permit
system designed to safeguard them from overexploitation.
THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE CITES FRAMEWORK
CITES is a voluntary international agreement that creates a
regulatory framework to limit and control trade in endangered
species. The heart of the Convention is its permit system, which sets
out the conditions under which trade may be conducted, and required
documentation and procedures for the management and monitoring
of trade. State parties are required to designate or establish national
authorities and regulations to implement the permit system in
accordance with the scheme that CITES prescribes. The success and
implementation of the treaty depend to a great extent on this network
of domestic regulatory bodies and laws.
The requirements for trade in a particular species depend upon the
level of protection it needs. Species are grouped into three
Appendixes, 134 according to their conservation status. Species that
are currently threatened with extinction are classified under
Appendix I. 135 Appendix II includes species which, although not
necessarily threatened with extinction at the moment, may become so
unless trade is regulated. Appendix II also contains several look-alike
species - that is, non-threatened species that are similar enough in
132. An in-depth overview of the CITES regime is beyond the scope of this
article. For an authoritative history and analysis, see Willem Wijnstekers, THE
EVOLUTION OF CITES (International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation:
2011).
133. CITES WEBSITE, MEMBER COUNTRIES, last accessed 7 March 2016:
https://cites.org/eng/disc/parties/index.php [https://perma.cc/T4QT-GGAV],
http://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/app/2014/E-Appendices-2014-09-
14.pdf [https://perma.ccV6K8-ZVJD].
134. CITES, Appendices I, II and III, valid from 5 Feb. 2015,
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/app/2015/E-Appendices-2015-02-05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TGW8-CKW5].
135. CITES, Article 11.1.
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appearance to protected species that shipments must be monitored
and inspected closely to prevent false trade. 136 The majority of
protected species are listed in Appendix II. Appendix III lists species
that have been accorded protected status in at least one country,
which has requested the cooperation and assistance of the other
parties to control trade in that vulnerable population.
137
Parties can unilaterally add species to Appendix III; however,
species classifications for Appendices I and II are agreed
multilaterally by the state parties, which meet every two to three
years to inter alia consider and adopt proposals to amend the
Appendixes. 138 In some instances, a species may have a split-listing,
in which the population in at least one country is listed in Appendix I,
while the populations of other countries are classified in Appendix II.
This is the case for the African elephant, for which the populations of
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe fall under
Appendix II, while all other country populations are under Appendix
I. 139 The larger of the two African species of rhinoceros, the
Southern white rhino, also has a split listing: Appendix II for South
Africa and Swaziland, while all other populations and the smaller
black rhino are under Appendix 1.140 Africa's great apes fall under
Appendix I, 1 4 1 and the African Grey Parrot is listed in Appendix
II. 142 A species' classification among the three Appendixes
determines the requirements that will adhere to their trade. Trade in
Appendix I species is generally prohibited, while the species listed in
Appendix II and III are subject to varying degrees of protection.
136. CITES, Article 11.2(a).
137. CITES, Article 11.3.
138. CITES, Article XI.
139. CITES, Appendices I, II and III, valid from 5 Feb. 2015,
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/app/2015/E-Appendices-2015-02-05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T9BU-HHHP].
140. CITES, Appendices I, II and III, valid from 5 Feb. 2015,
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/app/2015/E-Appendices-2015-02-05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9J72-NUMW].
141. CITES, Appendices I, II and III, valid from 5 Feb. 2015,
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/app/2015/E-Appendices-2015-02-05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7B3R-P939].
142. CITES, Grey Parrot,
https://cites.org/eng/gallery/species/bird/greyparrot.html [https://perma.cc/E2LJ-
R3ED].
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PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER CITES
The management and monitoring of trade in listed species is
handled by two national authorities which every state party is
required to designate: A Management Authority, which grants import
and export permits; and a Scientific Authority, which is charged with
evaluating and advising on the effects of trade on the status of
protected species. 143 Appendix I species carry the strictest limitations
on trade. Trade in specimens and products of species listed in
Appendix I requires both an import permit from the receiving nation,
as well as an export permit from the country of origin. The importing
state may only issue an import permit upon satisfaction of three
discrete conditions:
1. The importing state's Scientific Authority (SA) has advised
that the import will be for purposes that are not detrimental
to the survival of the species;
2. The importing state's SA is satisfied that the proposed
recipient is suitably equipped to house and care for the
animal; and
3. The importing state's Management Authority (MA) is
satisfied that the specimen is not to be used for primarily
commercial purposes.144
Four further conditions must be satisfied in order for the exporting
state to issue an export permit:
1. The exporting state's SA has advised that the export of the
specimen will not be detrimental to the survival of the
species;
2. The exporting state's MA is satisfied that the specimen was
not obtained in contravention of any of its species
protection laws;
3. The exporting state's MA is satisfied that any living
specimen is prepared and shipped so as to minimize the risk
of injury, cruelty or harm to health; and
143. CITES, Article IX; CITES WEBSITE, How CITES WORKS, available at
https://cites.org/eng/disc/how.php [https://perma.cc/FQW4-NEVY].
144. CITES, Article 111.3.
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4. The exporting state's MA is satisfied that an import permit
has been granted. 145
The strict requirements for trade in Appendix I species effectively
operate as a de facto ban on international trade, with very narrow
exceptions.
Appendix II species carry a more moderate level of protection.
Only an export permit is required, for which the criteria are the same
as for the granting of an Appendix I export permit, with the exception
that the MA need not confirm any import permit since none is
required. 146 Commercial trade in Appendix II species is permitted,
although the Convention requires that the SAs monitor the effect of
trade on species and advise their MAs if export permits should be
limited. 147 Trade in species listed in Appendix III also require only
an export permit, for which only the second and third Appendix I
criteria apply.
148
All member states are legally bound to implement this permitting
scheme, which may entail the adoption or revision of various
legislative and regulatory measures. CITES further requires Parties to
take appropriate steps to enforce the Convention and prohibit
unlawful trade, including imposing penalties and providing for
confiscation of illegal specimens or return to the state of export.
149
As was alluded to above, CITES' implementation depends almost
entirely on member states' successful translation of its permitting
system into concrete laws and penalties at the national level. The
recent surge in trafficking of endangered species highlights the great
extent to which many countries' existing frameworks remain unequal
to this important task.
BARRIERS TO PREVENTING AND COMBATING WILDLIFE CRIME
CITES' actual impact on the ground is determined largely by the
extent to which individual countries have laws in place to regulate
trade in endangered species, and the human and financial resources to
145. CITES, Article 111.2.
146. CITES, Article IV.2.
147. CITES, Article IV.3.
148. CITES, Article V.2.
149. CITES, Article V.111.
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enforce them. Unfortunately, many countries in Africa and elsewhere
lack the means and capacity to enact and implement the necessary
legislation. Gathering the requisite political will and support to
establish strong rules, and train and equip law enforcement and
customs is no small task, particularly for developing countries that
are confronting resource and capacity shortages on multiple fronts.
Corruption throughout many of the government agencies entrusted
with these responsibilities is another serious concern. Taken together,
the lack of adequate legislation and enforcement, resources, and
transparency in many member states constitute a formidable obstacle
to the success of this critical regime, and efforts to coordinate CITES
enforcement with other international frameworks aimed at tackling
corruption and organized crime.
LACK OF IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
Implementation of CITES... is impossible without a firm
legislative basis covering, at a minimum, the granting of
permits, the control of the validity of foreign permits and
the imposition of penalties, including the confiscation of
unlawfully traded specimens.
150
More than 40 years after the treaty's entry into force, many parties
still have not yet established the necessary national infrastructure to
implement CITES at the domestic level. The Convention's reliance
on its member states to adopt appropriate legal codes and
mechanisms, institute and maintain proper scientific and management
authorities, and penalize illegal trade has proven to be a significant
weakness.
CITES has had a dedicated project for reviewing and evaluating
national legislation since 1992. That year, at the eight meeting of the
parties, the member states adopted Resolution 8.4 directing the
CITES Secretariat - the administrative body that oversees the general
coordination of the Convention - to inter alia identify those Parties
whose domestic measures do not provide them with the authority to:
150. Cyrille de Klemm, GUIDELINES FOR LEGISLATION To IMPLEMENT CITES,
IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 26, 10 (IUCN: 1993), available at
https://portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/documents/EPLP-026.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9AV9-FUV5].
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i. Designate at least one Management Authority and one
Scientific Authority;
ii. Prohibit trade in specimens in violation of the
Convention;
iii. Penalize such trade; or
iv. Confiscate specimens illegally traded or possessed.
151
Pursuant to this mandate, the Secretariat initiated a National
Legislation Project to analyze and support Parties' efforts to adopt
the full range of legislative and administrative measures needed to
implement the Convention.
152
The National Legislation Project
The National Legislation Project is both a compliance and
technical assistance process. Parties are requested to submit the text
of their domestic CITES-implementing legislation, and these national
laws are then assessed against the four criteria set forth in Resolution
8.4, and classified into one of the following three categories:
151. CITES Conference of the Parties, Resolution Conf. 8.4 (Rev. CoP15),
National laws for implementation of the Convention (1992, 2010), Para. (a),
http://cites.org/sites/default/files/document!E-Res-08-04C 16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R9CZ-Z25P].
152. For additional information on the NLP, see CITES Secretariat, Doc. 9.24
(Rev.),
National Laws for Implementation of the Convention (1994), pp. 575-78,
http://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/09/doc/E9-Doc-23-25.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8TLR-EX67]; CITES Secretariat, Doc. 10.31 (Rev.),
National Laws for Implementation of the Convention (1997),
http://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/ 10/doc/E 10-31 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/P6NN-RX3V]; CITES Secretariat, Doc. 11.21.1, National
Legislation Project (2000),
http://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/ 11/doc/21_01.pdf; and CITES
Secretariat, CoP14 Doc. 24, National Laws for Implementation of the Convention
(2007), http://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/14/doc/E14-24.pdf
[https://perma.ccVW4J-E3 SA].
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Category 1: Legislation that is believed generally to meet all four
requirements for effective implementation of CITES;
Category 2: Legislation that is believed generally to meet one to
three of the four requirements for effective implementation of
CITES;
Category 3: Legislation that is believed generally not to meet any
of the four requirements for effective implementation of CITES.
153
The Secretariat produces regular reports on the status of parties'
progress for implementing the Convention. The most recent report
from January 2016154 identifies only 88 of the treaty's 181 member
states as having sufficiently comprehensive legislation to be
classified in Category 1.155 The vast majority of African parties have
yet to fully implement CITES in their domestic laws.
Fifty African states are currently parties the Convention, but only
ten of them are in Category 1.156 Another nineteen are in Category
2,157 and twenty are in Category 3.158 Angola, which joined in 2013,
153. The three-prong categorization was introduced by the CITES Secretariat in
1994, Doc. 9.24 (Rev.), National Laws for Implementation of the Convention
(1994), pp. 575-78, http://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/09/doc/E9-Doc-
23-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AGH-QTE2]. The COP agreed the use of the three
categories via its decisions taken regarding implementation of Resolution Conf.
8.4, in which it directed Party and Secretarial actions according to Parties'
categorization in Doc. 9.24 (Rev.): Decisions 6, 7 and 8 directed to the Parties, and
Decision 7 directed to the Secretariat, Decisions of the Conference of the Parties
(1994), pp. 122-123; 133-134,
http://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/09/E9-Dec.pdf
[https://perma.cc/THZ7-LYLP].
154. CITES Secretariat, National Laws for Implementation of the Convention,
SC66 Inf. 19 (2016) ((Information document prepared for the Sixty-sixth meeting of
the CITES Standing Committee, 11-15 January 2016), available at
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/66Inf/E-SC66-Inf-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N4N9-5QGF].
155. Id. at 2.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 5-12. The report lists the countries in Categories 2 and 3 in three
separate tables, according to the length of time the country has been a party to the
Convention: Twenty years or more, which includes 17 African countries in
Category 2, and 12 in Category 3 (pp. 5-9); less than twenty years and more than
five years, which includes 2 African countries in Category 2 and 8 in Category 3
(pp. 10-13); and five years of less, which includes 1 African country, Angola,
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is listed as pending as the Secretariat awaits submission of its
legislation for review. 159 Experts point to lack of resources, capacity
and political will to explain the implementation gap. 160 With national
legislation being the primary instrument for prescribing the nature,
scope and consequences of wildlife crime, the lack of strong
domestic infrastructure across the continent is a significant problem
for CITES and the endangered species it is meant to protect.
INADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT & PENALTIES
The absence of credible enforcement incentivizes
involvement in illicit wildlife trafficking as an alternative
to other crimes such as drug trafficking or human
trafficking.... [W]ildlife crime carries a lower risk of
detection and prosecution... Even when found guilty, those
who have profited from illicit wildlife trafficking receive
relatively low penalties, making the business an attractive
option for criminal groups.161
Another key challenge is adequate enforcement of the laws that
countries do have in place, and the lenience of the penalties imposed
in the few cases that reach the sentencing phase. Two recent studies
conducted by the international law firm DLA Piper reviewed the laws
and judicial processes of fourteen African countries - Angola,
Botswana, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya,
Republic of Congo, Gabon, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe - and found several
weaknesses. 162 With regard to the principal legislation on which
whose category is given as 'p,' which the table key indicates should be read as
"pending submission of legislation to the Secretariat" (pp. 14, 17).
158. Id.
159. CITES Secretariat, National Laws for Implementation of the Convention,
14, 17. See also supra note 157.
160. Anita S. Akella & Crawford Allan, Dismantling Wildlife Crime: Executive
Summary, TRAFFIC 1, 6 (2012), available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/the- 1636bn-trade-in-animal-
smuggling-2233608.html [https://perma.cc/LZU6-TBS2].
161. WWF, Fighting Illicit Wildlife Trafficking, supra note 84 at 23.
162. DLA Piper, Empty Threat: Does the Law Combat Illegal Wildlife Trade?
An Eleven-Country Review of Legislative and Judicial Approaches (2014),
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countries are relying to implement their CITES obligations, the
researchers encountered many laws with serious loopholes, as well as
a variety of execution gaps. 163 National laws that are theoretically
suitable for combating wildlife crime are sidelined in practice due to
reliance on subsidiary regulations that have not yet been enacted;
administrative agencies that have yet to be formed; and/or
implementation at the provincial level, where progress is uneven or
stalled. 164
Low rates of prosecutions for wildlife crime are another major
problem.1 65 A recent study in Kenya surveyed eighteen courts with
jurisdiction in key biodiversity areas around the country and found
that, of the 743 cases involving wildlife crimes registered in the study
period, 2008 to 2013, only 202 case files were available.1 66 The vast
majority of case files - over 70% - were missing or misplaced.1 67
Another recent assessment of illegal trade in ivory and rhino horn
between Africa and Asia found very few successful investigations,
available at http://www.dlapiperprobono.com/export/sites/pro-
bono/downloads/pdfs/Illegal-Wildlife-Trade-Report-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FFX2-7ZRQ]; Empty Threat 2015: Does the Law Combat Illegal
Wildlife Trade? A Review of Legislative and Judicial Approaches in Fifteen
Jurisdictions (2015), available at
http://www.dlapiperprobono.com/export/sites/pro-bono/downloads/pdfs/Illegal-
Wildlife-Trade-Report-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SFD-3W97]. See also WWF,
Wildlife Crime Scorecard - Assessing compliance with and enforcement of
cites commitments for tigers, rhinos and elephants (2012), available at
http://wwf.panda.org/about our earth/species/problems/illegal trade/wildlife trade
campaign/scorecard [https://perma.cc/BL2T-A9EY].
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.; see also WWF, Wildlife Crime Scorecard - Assessing compliance with
and enforcement of
cites commitments for tigers, rhinos and elephants (2012), available at
http://wwf.panda.org/about our earth/species/problems/illegal trade/wildlife trade
campaign/scorecard [https://perma.cc/2HLK-TDYQ].
166. Paula Kahumbu, et al., Scoping study on the prosecution of wildlife related
crimes in Kenyan courts -January 2008 to June 2013, 11 (Wildlife Direct: 2014),
available at
http://www.thedswt.org.uk/wildlifecrimekenya.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT5M-
DCQC].
167. Id.
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arrests or convictions. 168 Only 12% of ivory seizures resulted in
arrest and "throughout Africa, even when investigations result is
arrests, judiciary proceedings often undermine effective prosecution
and function as backdoor exit points for the individuals involved in
serious ivory trade crime." 169 Arrests for illegal trade in rhino horn
were higher, but typically involved low-level poachers and couriers
at the bottom of the criminal pyramid structure and had little impact
on the organizational leadership or operations.
170
Weak Penalties
A further area of concern is the strength and consistency of
penalties imposed in wildlife cases. In order to be effective, sanctions
need to be fair and commensurate with the harm caused, while also
severe and consistent enough to have the necessary deterrent effect.
While CITES requires parties to take measures to penalize illegal
trade, it does not specify any standards for the form or force that
penalties should take.171 Criminal fines and sentences are set by the
member states and vary widely, creating challenges for multilateral
efforts; inconsistency where judges and prosecutors enjoy wide
discretion; and, potentially, havens and soft targets for criminal
172groups.
In the Kenya study mentioned above, only 4% of convicted
offenders received custodial sentences; the other 90+% were simply
required to pay a fine or perform community service. 173 The authors
report further that, in the period under review, the value of the ivory
and rhino horn seized was approximately $44.5 million KES (roughly
$1M USD), yet the total fines collected were only $1.17M KES; that
is, less than 3% of the street value. 174 Similar findings are indicatedin the DLA Piper studies: The lack of sentencing guidelines and the
168. Tom Milliken, Illegal Trade in Ivory and Rhino Horn: an Assessment
Report to Improve Law Enforcement Under the Wildlife TRAPS Project, (USAID
and TRAFFIC: 2014), available at
https://www.usaid.govlsitesldefaultlfilesldocuments/1865W- TRAPS-Elephant-
Rhino-report.pdJ[ https://perma.cc/J3S4-DZD8].
169. Id. at 9.
170. Id. at 21-22.
171. CITES, Article VIII.1.
172. DLA Piper reports, supra note 162.
173. Kahumbu et al., supra note 168 at 14.
174. Id.
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considerable discretion given to both prosecutors and judges in many
of the countries surveyed leads to lower and suspended sentences, as
well as the failure to impose mandatory fines. 175 Limited convictions
and low or nonexistent fines and sentences embolden traffickers:
"[T]he combination of weak penalties and a low risk of prosecution
create an insufficient deterrent to outweigh the financial "rewards" of
the illegal wildlife trade. 176
ANCILLARY OFFENSES: MISSING LINKS TO THE UNCTOC REGIME
Another potential avenue for combating wildlife crime is the
prosecution of so-called related or ancillary offenses: Crimes, such as
document fraud, money-laundering, bribery and corruption, illegal
use of weapons, tax evasion and non-payment of fees and tariffs, and
participation in organized crime, that often accompany and facilitate
wildlife poaching and trafficking. Ancillary offenses can be used to
bolster wildlife enforcement by providing an additional basis for
arrest, conviction and the imposition of effective penalties.
Unfortunately, despite the fact that violations of ancillary offenses
often carry heavier sentences, the DLA Piper researchers found that
prosecutions for wildlife offenses still tend to be brought solely under
anti-poaching and other wildlife-specific laws.
177
The primary international agreement in this area is the 2000 UN
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC). 178
The UNCTOC was adopted with the aim to standardize and
coordinate legislative, administrative and enforcement responses to
transnational organized crime worldwide. 179 Parties commit to
undertaking a series of measures, including the creation of domestic
criminal offences for corruption, money laundering, participation in
an organized criminal group, and obstruction of justice; 180
175. DLA Piper reports, supra note 162.
176. DLA Piper, Empty Threat 2015, supra note 162, at 5.
177. DLA Piper reports, supra note 162.
178. 2000 UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC),
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%/o20Conventi
on!TOCebook-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3ZN-UNKQ].
179. 2000 UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC),
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%/o20Conventi
on/TOCebook-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9U6-ZRYP].
180. UNCTOC, Arts. 5 - 8, 23.
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strengthening frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance and
law enforcement cooperation; i1 1 and training and technical assistance
for national authorities. 182 In addition to the domestic criminal
offenses covered in the Convention, it also applies to all 'serious
183
crime' with a transnational organized criminal aspect, with
'serious crime' being defined as any offense punishable by a
"maximum deprivation of liberty for at least four years or a more
serious penalty." 184 Although the preamble to the Convention
includes wildlife trafficking among the criminal activities that the
UNCTOC is intended to address,' 85 many countries' wildlife crime
sanctions do not currently meet this standard.186 A similar gap occurs
where wildlife offenses are not included among the predicate
offenses to which money-laundering laws apply. 187 When wildlife
enforcement efforts are left outside the scope of UNCTOC
implementation, they lose out on the extensive cooperation and
resources available under this Convention. Even in countries where
wildlife crimes are serious crimes and predicate offenses under anti-
money laundering legislation, the efficacy of these provisions - and
the principal wildlife laws they may bolster - depends on the
awareness, willingness and capability of prosecutors and judges to
apply them in practice. Unfortunately, a great deal of work remains
to be done to improve prosecutorial and judicial capacity and
processes to effectively combat wildlife crime in Africa, and
worldwide. 188
181. UNCTOC, Arts. 16, 18, 27.
182. UNCTOC, Art. 29.
183. UNCTOC, Art. 3(b).
184. UNCTOC, Art. 2(b).
185. UNCTOC, Preamble, "Strongly convinced that the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime will constitute an effective tool
and the necessary legal framework for international cooperation in combating, inter
alia, such criminal activities as... illicit trafficking in endangered species of wild
flora and fauna..."
186. Lorraine Elliott, Fighting Transnational Environmental Crime, 66 J. INT'
AFF. 87, 95 (2012).
187. DLA Piper reports, supra note 162.
188. Id.
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RESOURCE & CAPACITY CHALLENGES
Enacting strong principle and ancillary laws at the national level is
just a first step. The effectiveness of the CITES and UNCTOC
regimes depends just as heavily, if not more so, on whether the
implementing laws are being adequately applied and enforced on the
ground. Chronic, widespread resource and capacity shortfalls in
justice systems across the African continent present yet another
obstacle to the effective prosecution and deterrence of wildlife crime:
The inadequacy of budgets, personnel, and equipment -
across sites, countries, and agencies - significantly
compromises the ability of enforcement systems to
function effectively... Detection agents, investigators,
prosecutors and judges frequently lack the technical skills,
tools, forensics and expertise needed to ensure that wildlife
crime laws are adequately enforced.18 9
The protection of endangered species requires stable governments
with adequate human and financial resources; however, a number of
African countries report that they lack both the means and capacity to
control illegal hunting and trade.1 90
Creating and sustaining proper scientific and management
authorities requires considerable funding and highly-skilled staff,
which many countries simply do not have. Customs officials are
often unfamiliar with the CITES appendixes and trade limitations
that they are designated to enforce: "Since personnel are untrained,
enforcement capacity is weak. Because enforcement capacity is
weak, it is no surprise that illicit trade goes unreported. Several
countries have noted that they have neither the resources nor the
capacity to comply."1 91 The lack of qualified personnel is a major
obstacle to effective control of trade.
189. Akella & Allan, Dismantling Wildlife Crime: Executive Summary, 8.
190. Yvonne Fiadjoe, CITES in Africa: An Examination of Domestic
Implementation and Compliance, 4(1) SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW &
POLICY 38, 41-42 (2014), available at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article- 1364&context
-sdlp [https://perma.cc/CEX7-SDLL].
191. Id.
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Similar budgetary and capacity constraints impair efforts to patrol
and guard protected areas across the continent. The relatively low
priority accorded to wildlife and habitat protection in most countries
translates into limited staffing, training and resources on the
ground. 192 In a recent statement, the head wildlife officer of the
Central African Republic indicated that his department has only 1 10
rangers to cover 6.4 million hectares of national parks, 193 an area
more than twice the size of Belgium. In the face of mounting
incursions from heavily armed criminal gangs, lightly equipped and
unarmed wardens defend these protected areas at great risk and
disadvantage.194
Investigative authorities are, likewise, under-resourced,
understaffed and undertrained which, in turn, limits crime detection.
Insufficient investigative resources and skills undermine the
collection and evaluation of the forensic evidence on which wildlife
crime prosecutions so often depend: 
195
Most developing countries do not have access to modern
investigative tools such as DNA mapping and other
advanced forensic methodologies to trace products. Even
basic methodologies for operations such as crime scene
investigations, which are critical for effective prosecution,
are often not carried out appropriately. 196
The critical lack of finances extends to the rest of the justice system,
as well, where judges and prosecutors are appointed and serve for197
years with no formal training in wildlife law. Prosecutorial and
judicial offices are also chronically understaffed, 198 and generally
lack the necessary case management systems to effectively track and
document case files. 199 At every step in the enforcement chain,
inadequate resources and capacity contribute to ineffective
implementation of the domestic laws on which global efforts to
192. Bennett, supra note 104, at 477.
193. WWF, Fighting Illicit Wildlife Trafficking, at 24.
194. Nigel Dudley et al., Editorial: Wildlife Crime Poses Unique Challenges to
Protected Areas, 19 PARKS 7, 9 (2013).
195. DLA Piper reports, supra note 162.
196. WWF, Fighting Illicit Wildlife Trafficking, at 24.
197. DLA Piper reports, supra note 162.
198. Id.
199. Kahumbu et al., supra note 168 at 17.
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combat wildlife crime very much depend. In addition, when
enforcement officials are underpaid, they may be more susceptible to
bribes, which the criminal organizations that profit from illegal
trafficking can easily afford to pay. These illegal payments are just
one of the many forms of corruption that help to fuel and facilitate
wildlife crime worldwide.
CORRUPTION
The very nature of wildlife trade makes it susceptible to
corruption, as it often requires official permits and
clearances to meet regulatory requirements and laws - at
the source, transit and market levels. z°
Corruption, broadly defined, entails the misuse of entrusted power
for private gain.z20 In the context of wildlife crime, it is a critical
factor in the sourcing, transfer and sale of wildlife specimens and
products, as well as the laundering of the proceeds from the illegal
202wildlife trade. Efforts to combat wildlife poaching and trafficking
are hampered severely when the very institutions mandated to
enforce wildlife conservation and trade provisions are mired in
corruption.20
3
Several studies have demonstrated that wildlife crime thrives in
countries with high levels of corruption, engaging corrupt officials at
all levels of government, from park rangers, border guards and
customs officials, to police and military officers; from judges and
204prosecutors to embassy staff and diplomats. A recent analysis by
200. Akella & Allan, Dismantling Wildlife Crime: Executive Summary, 8.
201. WEBSITE OF TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, WHAT IS CORRUPTION?,
http://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption/ [https://perma.cc/MZ3V-FJ9G].
202. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Wildlife Crime and Corruption, U4
Expert Answer No. 367 (2013), available at
http://www.u4.no/publications/wildlife-crime-and-corruption/; see also Tanya
Wyatt & Anh Ngoc Cao, Corruption and wildlife trafficking, U4 Issue No. 11
(2015), available at http://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-and-wildlife-
trafficking/ [https://perma.cc/T7WV-A7K6].
203. Fiadjoe, supra note 190, at 40.
204. Id.; see also Ayling, supra note 80; Douglas & Alie, supra note 112.
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the expert U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre details the many
ways in which corruption enables wildlife crime:
2 5
Corruption may facilitate many of the crimes along the
wildlife trade route, from poaching (e.g. illegal payments to
issue hunting licenses, bribery of forest patrol officers), to
trafficking (e.g. bribery of customs officials, illegal
payments to issue export certificates, etc), to law
enforcement (e.g. bribery of police officers and prosecutors
to avoid investigations; illegal payments to manipulate
court decisions). In addition, corruption and weak
regulatory frameworks may offer several opportunities to
criminal organisations to launder the proceeds of crime.
One key element is document fraud, in the form of issuing a
hunting or trade license with terms that violate the applicable law, as
well as the supply of falsified - or, in some cases, blank - hunting
licenses and import and export permits. 206 Criminal networks have
also used captive breeding operations to launder wild-caught
specimens and the illegal proceeds of wildlife crime. 207 Another
common practice is the payment and acceptance of bribes to suspend
payment of applicable taxes, duties, tariffs and fees; and overlook
illegal hunting and shipments, including fraudulent documents and
irregular containers that are above permitted levels or declared below
value or volume.2 °8
Corruption frequently pervades the criminal justice system, as
well. Corrupt officials may turn a blind eye to illegal hunts, alert
criminal networks of planned investigations or inspections, or
deliberately botch their evidence-gathering or case preparation to
1 209 Bicyo rsctr
enable the accused to avoid arrest or trial. Bribery of prosecutors
and judges is also widespread, leading to reduced charges and
penalties, improper bail approvals and case dismissals. 2  At the
highest levels, diplomatic staff may abuse their diplomatic immunity
205. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, supra note 202.
206. Id. at 3-4.
207. Id. at 4.
208. Id. at 3-4.
209. Id. at 4.
210. Id.
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to traffic illegal animals or goods; officials may maintain a personal
or financial interest in the very activities they are meant to regulate or
help launder the proceeds of wildlife crime; and corruption may be
used to influence wildlife law and policy.
211
Corruption in governmental institutions is a serious challenge for
wildlife conservation and management, and good governance and the
rule of law overall. In 2003, the international community built on the
precedent of the UNCTOC by adopting another legally binding treaty
to "promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat
corruption." 212 Like the UNTOC, the UN Convention against
Corruption (UNCAC) provides another important legal basis for
combating wildlife and forest crime. The Convention requires that
state parties implement a range of preventive anti-corruption213
measures, as well as measures relating to criminalization and law
214 1215 216
enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery, and
technical assistance and information exchange.217 At this time, the
majority of African states have signed on to the treaty, which entered
218into force in 2005 and now has 178 parties. Nonetheless,
2 19corruption remains a significant problem in Africa, and many of
the challenges that confound efforts to combat wildlife crime in
combination with ancillary offenses under the UNCTOC, have
211. Id. at 3-4.
212. 2003 UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), ch. 1, art. 1., available
at
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/JNCAC/Publications/Convention!08-
50026_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX8J-SFL3].
213. UNCAC, Chapter II.
214. UNCAC, Chapter III.
215. UNCAC, Chapter IV.
216. UNCAC, Chapter V.
217. UNCAC, Chapter VI.
218. WEBSITE OF THE UN TREATY COLLECTION, CHAPTER XVIII - PENAL
MATTERS, 14. UN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION,
https://Treaties.Un.Org/Pages/Viewdetails.Aspx?Src-Ind&Mtdsg No=Xviii-
14&Chapter-18&Lang=En [https://perma.cc/6FLX-EP7T].
219. Transparency International, People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015 -
Global Corruption Barometer (2015), available at
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/peopleand corruption africa_
survey_2015 [https://perma.cc/59QY-CAK3].
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limited the practical implementation of the UNCAC in many African
nations, as well.22°
Although corruption - together with weak regulations,
enforcement and borders - continues to make African wildlife a
target for transnational organized crime, the past few years have
brought increased awareness and focus on the illegal wildlife trade as
a national and international security issue, as well as a biodiversity
and conservation concern. As a result, powerful alliances among
international institutions from across the law enforcement spectrum
are forming to assist the CITES regime and national governments to
reduce and prevent illegal wildlife poaching and trafficking.
220. UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) State Of Implementation Of The
United Nations Convention Against Corruption Criminalization, Law
Enforcement And International Cooperation (2015), available at
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session6/15-
03457_ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR77-EJSQ]; DLA Piper reports, supra note
162. Individual country reports are also available on the UNODC website's
Country Profiles page, at: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/country-
profile/index.html [https://perma.cc/HH84-5AA5 ].
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CONCLUSION
In response to growing recognition of the serious threats to African
wildlife and the wider implications for local stability and global
security, several encouraging developments suggest that a
coordinated international response is underway. In July 2015, the UN
General Assembly adopted a resolution urging member states to take
decisive steps to prevent, combat and eradicate illegal trade in
wildlife.22 1 In addition, the newly adopted Sustainable Development
Goals explicitly address tackling illegal trade in wildlife through
specific Targets under Goal 15, which state:
15.7: Take urgent action to end poaching and trafficking of
protected species of flora and fauna and address both
demand and supply of illegal wildlife products.
15.c: Enhance global support for efforts to combat
poaching and trafficking of protected species, including by
increasing the capacity of local communities to pursue
sustainable livelihood opportunities.
222
Similar developments have also taken place in Africa at the
regional level, as well. In June 2014, the African Union adopted a
decision on the conservation of African wildlife and the illegal
223
wildlife trade. The following May, member states issued a strong
declaration urging coordinated regional and international action
against wildlife crime, including the conclusion of an Africa-wide
221. UN General Assembly, Resolution 691314 - Tackling illicit trafficking in
wildlife, A/RES/69/314 (2015), available at
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/news/pr/2015/UNGA res illicit-trade-wildli
fe.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9WB-89KX].
222. Sustainable Development Goals, available at
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.orgl?menu-1300 [https://perma.cc/N9WB-
89KX]
223. Decision EX.CL/ Dec.832 (XXV) of the Executive Council of the African
Union (2014).
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draft strategy and action plan to reduce and eliminate illegal wildlife
trade .224
Since 2009, an inter-agency alliance, the International Consortium
on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC) 2 25 has joined the efforts of
five inter-governmental organizations - the CITES Secretariat, the
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the World
Bank, the World Customs Organization (WCO), and the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 226 - to provide
coordinated support for national wildlife law enforcement agencies,
and sub-regional and regional networks, working in defense of
natural resources. In 2012, the ICCWC launched a Wildlife and
Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit 227 to help governments assess the
effectiveness of their responses to wildlife and forest crime, and
document their technical assistance needs.228
The ICCWC Toolkit is an invaluable tool for identifying gaps and
challenges in national wildlife legislation and efforts to integrate
wildlife enforcement with measures to combat corruption and
organized crime. Detailed and exhaustive, the toolkit provides precise
explanations and prompts for wildlife administrators to understand
the strengths and weaknesses of their existing laws and policies.
These analyses, in turn, provide sound indications of where
additional human, technical, and financial capacity is needed, and can
inform targeted requests for assistance. The ICCWC offers support
for government authorities to conduct national Toolkit assessments;
and UNODC, which serves as the lead agency for the consortium,
has also recently developed forensic guidelines for ivory sampling
and laboratory analysis, as well. As Toolkit implementations
224. TRAFFIC, African leaders agree on co-ordinated response and action
against illegal exploitation and illicit trade of wild flora and fauna in Africa (2015),
available at http://www.traffic.org/home/2015/5/3/african-leaders-agree-on-co-
ordinated-response-and-action-ag.html [https://perma.cc/CU9Z-SURG] (includes
link to English translation of declaration).
225. CITES Website, The International Consortium on Combating Wildlife
Crime, http://www.cites.org/eng/prog/iccwc.php [https://perma.cc/A26Y-J4ZF].
226. CITES Website, ICCWC partners,
http://www.cites.org/prog/iccwc.php/Partners [https://perma.cc/C4WR-RW67].
227. ICCWC, Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit (2012),
http://www.cites.org/common/resources/pub/ICCWCToolkit v2 english.pdf
228. CITES Website, Tools, http://www.cites.org/eng/prog/iccwc.php/Tools
[https://perma.cc/S6YX-H9FY].
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proceed, countries will be positioned to improve their legal responses
to wildlife crime with clear mandates, roles, and penalties.
In addition to initiatives to strengthen these vital legal frameworks,
more support needs to be given to enforcement bodies - police,
prosecution, judiciary and customs - including adequate resources
and training. The agencies and authorities central to the fight against
wildlife crime must be afforded the same level of resources and
support as is provided to prevent and suppress other forms of
transnational crime. At the same time, ongoing efforts to address
corruption will be crucial, with a focus on building capacity and
integrity in customs, law enforcement, and the judiciary.
Above all, strategies to improve law enforcement and strengthen
criminal justice systems must be accompanied by initiatives to
support sustainable livelihoods across the continent, and share the
benefits from sustainable wildlife management:
Ultimately, the illegal wildlife trade will be best controlled
not by guns and rangers but by solutions that respect and
make partners of local communities and landowners,
through providing sound incentives and opportunities to
value and conserve wildlife.
229
Communities must be involved in create enduring incentives and
opportunities for conserving threatened species for the people, rather
than from the people. Success depends on strong Africa-owned,
Africa-led solutions that address rural poverty and human-wildlife
conflict, and deliver both conservation and development.
229. IED, The elephant in the room: Sustainable use in the illegal wildlife trade
debate (2014), available at http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/1720511ED.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9FSJ-WK9G].
